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1Abstract
This paper studies the impact of the reference price (RP) system on the price-
setting strategies of pharmaceutical ﬁrms. The RP system is equivalent to setting
an additional but avoidable copayment for those drugs whose price exceeds the ref-
erence level. Using a vertical product diﬀerentiation model, we show that branded
drug producers decrease prices substantially after the introduction of this new
copayment regime while generic prices remain more or less constant. As a conse-
quence, price competition increases under the new regulatory framework, however,
market share for generic drugs remain constant or even decreases. We can ﬁnally
conclude that, although the social planner succeeds in promoting price competi-
tion, it completely fails in raising generic drug usage among the population. Both
the implementation of the RP system and the potential entrance of generics consti-
tute a suﬃciently credible threat to make branded drug producers decrease price,
thus fostering eﬀective competition.
Keywords: Brand-name and generic drugs, pricing strategies and optimal price
regulation.
JEL codes: I18, L11, L15, L51.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Several European countries have already established this new reimbursement
mechanism - RP system- as a regulatory measure aimed at containing na-
tional pharmaceutical spending through the promotion of price competition
and the increased usage of generic drugs. Although there are several vari-
ations in the RP calculation method, we employ a general expression that
could be adapted to all European versions; therefore, our conclusions could
be extrapolated to those countries with similar regulatory frameworks.
We analyze two diﬀerent scenarios: (i) we ﬁrst solve quality and price
equilibrium before the RP system enters into force; in this case, we assume
that consumers must pay a constant copayment rate k for both branded and
generic drugs and (ii) in the second scenario, we introduce the eﬀect of the
RP system which entails an additional but avoidable copayment for those
drugs whose price exceeds the reference level.
Until now, several economists have deeply examined what happens to
the prices of innovator drugs when generic versions enter the market and,
although the majority of them agree about the existence of a non-zero ef-
fect, there is some dispute about the direction of such impact (Section 2.1).
However, once the competitive framework has been distorted due to the im-
plementation of the RP system, previously reached conclusions are not valid
any more because they were obtained under the assumption of non-price
regulation.We now require a diﬀerent scenario in which a new regulatory
measure is introduced (Section 2.2).
According to a recent review on the RP system (López-Casasnovas and
Puig-Junoy, 2001), the existing literature on the impact of such reimburse-
ment mechanism has been mainly descriptive and the absence of a common
theoretical framework has hindered the design of an optimal regulatory mea-
sure. However, few authors have recently looked into the problem from a
theoretical or empirical viewpoint (Zweifel and Crivelli 1996, Aronsson et al
2001, Pavnick 2002, Cabrales 2003, Mestre-Ferrándiz 2003).
We use a vertical product diﬀerentiation model with two ﬁrms operating
in the market: one ﬁrm produces the brand-name drug whose patent has
already expired (B) and the other produces the corresponding generic version
or branded copy (G). We assume a two-stage game where, in the ﬁrst stage,
ﬁrms choose the ”perceived” quality of the good they want to produce and,
in the second stage, a competitive process occurs whereby ﬁrms set prices.
Furthermore, at each stage of the game, ﬁr m sm a k et h e i rd e c i s i o n sa b o u t
3quality and prices both simultaneously and sequentially. Therefore, we ob-
tain four diﬀerent models. We solve the quality game t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n t
two diﬀerent assumptions about entry temporality: branded copies or ”me-
too” drugs enter the market simultaneously with the original product while
generic drugs enter the market after the patent on the corresponding brand-
name drug has already expired. We solve the price-setting sub-game
by taking into account Bertrand and Stackelberg price competition. It is
widely accepted that price is one of the main strategic variables in the phar-
maceutical industry, however, some researchers assume simultaneous price
competition while others accept sequential price competition (Section 3).
We ﬁnd that, under the RP system, branded drug producers decrease
prices substantially in order to adapt to the new competitive situation while
generic prices remain more or less constant. In Bertrand models, market
share percentages do not change after the introduction of reference prices
while, in Stackelberg models, the market share of branded drugs even in-
creases and that of generic drugs decreases. In both cases, the branded drug
producers compensate for the decline of proﬁts by selling greater quantities
instead of charging higher prices. Our theoretical results are in line with re-
cent empirical ﬁndings (Section 4). We also carry out a social welfare analysis
and compare price competition under the RP system and Ramsey pricing.
We ﬁnd that the reference price system maximizes price competition when
the penetration of generic drugs exceeds 70% of the market; otherwise, Ram-
sey prices can better ensure price competition and maximization of social
welfare (Section 5).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an in-depth descrip-
tion of the main regulatory frameworks and the characteristics of supply and
demand in the pharmaceutical market. Section 3 introduces the assumptions
regarding both simultaneous and sequential product diﬀerentiation models.
Section 4 explores the impact of the RP system on price and quantity strate-
gies. Section 5 presents a social welfare analysis and calculates the Ramsey
prices; ﬁnally, Section 6 summarizes the results and presents the conclusions
of the paper.
42 Characteristics of the Pharmaceutical Mar-
ket
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the reference price
(RP) system on the price-setting strategies of pharmaceutical ﬁrms, dealing
with both branded and generic drug producers. RP is a regulatory measure
aimed at containing pharmaceutical spending by promoting the usage of
lower-cost generic drugs. Although we mainly focus on the Spanish case
due to proximity, we are able to extend our conclusions to those European
countries with similar regulatory frameworks.
The entry process of generic drugs follows a parallel pattern worldwide,
nevertheless, owing to diﬀerent political, social and cultural contexts, some
countries exhibit high penetration rates while others are unable to attain
as i g n i ﬁcant market share.1 Several European countries, such as Denmark,
Germany, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Spain and The Netherlands, have intro-
duced diﬀerent types of RP mechanisms with substantial variations between
them. However, the principle always remains the same: the price paid by
the third-party is established with reference to interchangeable drugs, with
any excess cost being borne by the consumer as an out-of-pocket expense.
2.1 Generic Drugs Entry
One of the primary goals of Law 13/96 was to set up a competitive frame-
work in the Spanish pharmaceutical market by promoting the availability of
lower-cost generic drugs.2 The so-called generic drugs are those medicines
that contain the same active ingredient as a brand-name drug and enter the
market once the patent on the latter has expired.
1Countries such as Germany (32%), The Netherlands (39.9%) and UK (46.45%) enjoy
a high ”generics over total drugs” ratio while Belgium (1%), France (4%), Italy (0.75%)
and Spain (3.6%) are characterized by low generic drug penetration rates (Source: ”Gasto
Farmacéutico (I) en Europa. Comparación del Año 2000”, El Global, 2001;a v a i l a b l ea t
www.elglobal.net).
2Law 13/96, 30 December, entitled ”Medidas administrativas, ﬁscales y del orden so-
cial” that modiﬁes Law 25/1990 also called ”Ley del Medicamento”. In the USA, the act
commonly known as the Waxman-Hatch Act aimed to reduce expenditures on prescription
drugs by encouraging generic drug entry. It eliminated the strict requirements for FDA
approval of generic substitutes and replaced them with conditions that require much less
stringent testing.
5Generic drugs cost less than their innovator counterparts because of their
lower initial investment in R&D. In this sense, they become very attractive
for national health systems because they are expected to play an active role in
holding down pharmaceutical spending. The rise of pharmaceutical spending
in the last decade has led governments to encourage the use of these cheaper
drugs amongst the population and medical centers with the aim of fostering
price competition between branded and generic versions (Figure 1.1).3
Source: Spanish Ministry of Health (data available at www.pmfarma.com) Source: Spanish Ministry of Health (data available at www.pmfarma.com)
Figure 1.1. Public Pharmaceutical Spending in Spain (1987-1999)
In order to obtain oﬃcial approval from Agencia Española del Medica-
mento, generic versions are only required to certify ”bioequivalence” to the
corresponding innovator drug; in other words, to show that the active in-
gredient is released and absorbed at the same rate for the generic drug as
for the corresponding innovator.4 However, although brand-name drugs and
3Accumulated growth rate of Spanish public pharmaceutical spending for the period
1987-1999 is 140%.
4The task of Agencia Española del Medicamento in Spain corresponds to that of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the USA. Generally speaking, generic drugs
obtain oﬃcial approval under a shorter process than innovator drugs.
6their corresponding generic versions are supposed to be perfect substitutes
in terms of quality and therapeutic eﬀects, in fact, from the consumers’ and
physicians’ point of view, they are not.
Demand Side: Once generic drugs enter the market, uncertainty about
their quality arises. Consumers tend to re-use those medicines that have
worked for them in preference to taking the risk of trying drugs that they have
not tested before and that may not suit them. In pharmaceutical markets,
consumers behave as if they face a switching cost equal to the maximum
premium that they would be willing to pay to be guaranteed a product of the
same value as that of a product they have previously purchased (Klemperer,
1995). That is, a product of unknown quality is inherently riskier than a
product of known quality. Because it is less risky, consumers will pay a
higher price for the product with the known quality (Conrad, 1983).
In our model, we assume that a fraction of consumers face high switch-
ing costs and manifest strong preferences for brand-name drugs while the
remainder is more price-sensitive and show negligible switching cost. Loyal
consumers are extremely committed to brand-name drugs and exhibit a state
of dependence in their purchasing patterns because their preferences depend
on their past history of prescriptions (Coscelli, 2000). This uncertainty about
quality creates an artiﬁcial vertical diﬀerentiation that segments consumers’
demand.
Doctors are also responsible for this artiﬁcial product diﬀerentiation be-
cause they are relevant decision-makers in the drug purchasing process. As
Hellerstein (1998) found, almost all physicians prescribe two types of drug,
but some of them are more likely to prescribe generic drugs while others
are more likely to prescribe brand-name versions. The latter exhibit habit
persistence, in other words, they have a tendency to prescribe repeatedly the
same brand-name drug (Coscelli, 2000). There are several possible reasons
why physicians do not prescribe generic drugs more often, but the one that
stands out most is the lack of information about the availability and eﬃcacy
of generic versions.
Under the new regulatory framework, pharmacists also play an impor-
tant role:5 if physicians prescribe a brand-name drug whose price exceeds
the reference level, pharmacists are able to substitute it for its corresponding
generic version as long as the consumer agrees. Masson and Steiner (1985)
5In Spain, Law 66/1997, 30 December, entitled ”Medidas Fiscales, Administrativas y
del Orden Social” that modiﬁed article 94 of the ”Ley del Medicamento.”
7have performed an analysis of the initial period after the new state substi-
tution law in the United States and found that these new laws have indeed
increased the price sensitivity and, consequently, the amount of generic drug
usage in the market.
There is a close relationship between experts -both physicians and pharmacists-
and patients. Patients place blind trust in their doctors’ opinion and are re-
luctant to switch to generic drugs if physicians do not advise them to do so.
The asymmetric information between doctors and patients certainly suggests
the possibility that the former could use their position of superior knowledge
for their own ﬁnancial beneﬁt. In the absence of incentives, physicians are
more likely to continue prescribing brand-name drugs instead of generic ver-
sions. In Health Economics, this phenomenon is commonly known as the
supplier-induced-demand eﬀect.
Therefore, under the new regulatory scenario, the demand for drugs can
be characterized as follows: the physician prescribes, the pharmacist dis-
penses and substitutes whenever possible, the patient consumes and pays a
fraction of the drug cost as an out-of-pocket expense and, ﬁnally, the third-
party pays the rest. In this framework, there is an agency relationship be-
tween physician and patient and another between pharmacist and patient,
however, analysis of this does not fall within the scope of this article. In our
model, we assume that patients are the unique decision-makers.
Supply Side: The supply side in pharmaceutical markets is charac-
terized by a ﬁrst mover pricing leadership. Once a breakthrough drug is
introduced, its manufacturer enjoys a period of exclusivity until the patent
expires. Several authors have argued that a pioneering brand is able to
establish a reputation which later entrants cannot overcome without large
promotional expenditures or drastic price cuts.
The period of exclusivity grants some monopoly rents and market advan-
tages for the innovator such as high market shares, locked-in consumers and
high-quality products reputation. Furthermore, this period of exclusivity al-
lows the branded drug producer to enjoy a future price leadership. Once a
patent expires, all interested producers can manufacture the generic version
and enter the market. Generally speaking, we can assume that there are
relatively low barriers to entry because the generic approval process does not
take long, it is not very costly and producers of generic drugs do not need to
duplicate research costs.
82.1.1 Impact of Generic Drugs Entry on Pricing Strategies
The impact of generic drug entry on the price-setting strategies of branded
drug producers has been a source of controversy. Several economists have
examined what happens to the prices of innovator drugs when generic copies
enter the market and, although the majority of them agree about the exis-
tence of a non-zero eﬀe c t ,t h e r ei ss o m ed i s p u t ea b o u tt h ed i r e c t i o no fs u c h
impact. Another point to emphasize is the fact that all empirical studies use
data from the United States market, thus assuming non-price regulation.
Grabowski and Vernon (1992) found that innovator prices continued to
rise faster than inﬂation after generic entry. On the contrary, Caves et al
(1991) attempted to estimate the rate of price increase that would have
occurred without generic entry, concluding that although the prices of many
brand-name drugs kept on rising after generic entry, those prices were still
lower than they would have otherwise been.
Frank and Salkever (1997) found that brand-name drug prices increased
at a faster rate than would have been the case had generic entry not oc-
curred. More recently, Mestre-Ferrándiz (1999) found that brand-name drug
producers also have incentives to produce generic alternatives; this leads to
an increase in the price of the brand-name drug produced by this ﬁrm. Ching
(2000) argued that consumer heterogeneity in terms of price elasticity could
explain the pricing pattern that caused branded price increases in response
to generic drug entry. The above-mentioned studies assume demand market
segmentation; that is, when generics enter the market, price sensitive con-
sumers switch to low cost versions and, consequently, the branded drug ﬁrm
faces a more price inelastic demand and can hence raise its price. This is
called the Generic Competition Paradox.
On the other hand, Ellison et al (1997) found that in one antibiotic mar-
ket, demand for a brand-name drug is more sensitive to changes in the price
of its generic substitutes than to changes in the price of a competing brand-
name drug.
2.2 Reference Price System and Promotion of Gener-
ics
Increases in national pharmaceutical spending over the last decade have led
governments to adopt several regulatory measures aimed at promoting price
competition through generic drug entry, controlling sale prices and proﬁt
9margins, and establishing new reimbursement mechanisms. The lower price
of generic drugs with respect to branded versions has encouraged public ad-
ministrations to promote generic drug usage as a mechanism to contain na-
tional pharmaceutical spending and monitor the quality of pharmaceutical
care. Each country has implemented slightly diﬀerent pharmaceutical policy
mechanisms and their success has been closely related to the political, social
and cultural context within which each health care systems operates. One
of the most popular measures has been the promotion of prescribing, dis-
pensing and consuming lower-price generic drugs through the introduction
of reference prices and substitution laws (Table 1.1).
AB D K F I N FG G R I C I R L I L N L NPSS w C H G B
Laboratory sale price
control
-  -  --  --  -  ---
New drugs reimbursement
control  -  --  -
International comparison  -  -
Reference price system  --  --  -  ---  -  --
Devolution/contracts  ---  ---  ---  - 
Profits control -------------- -- 
Promotional spending control  -- -  --------- -- 
Prescription drugs budget -----  --  -------- 
Pharmaco-economic evidence
recommendation
---  -----  -  -  - 
Wholesaler fixed margins  --  -  --  - 
Pharmacists fixed margins 
Generic substitution --  --  -  -  ---
Copayment rates  - 
OTC price control -  ----  ---  -------
Price control for hospital use
drugs 
-  ----  --  ----  ---
Source: “DiagnósticoyPerspectiva del Gasto Farmacéutico en España”, NERA. Report published byFarmaindustria.
A=Austria; B=Belgium; DK=Denmark; FIN=Finland; F=France; G=Germany; GR=Greece; IC=Iceland; IRL=Ireland; I=Italy; L=Luxembourg; NL= Netherlands; 
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Table 1.1. The Main Mechanisms for Controlling Pharmaceutical Spending
in European Countries
2.2.1 Reference Price System
In Spain, Royal Decree 1035/1999 regulates the mechanism by which govern-
ment calculates the reference price for those drugs funded by Social Security
and included in the submarket of drugs whose patent has already expired.
10Since the introduction of the RP system in Germany in 1989, diﬀerent ver-
sions have been implemented in various European countries with substantial
modiﬁcations. However the principle always remains the same: the price paid
by the third-party is established by reference to interchangeable drugs, with
any excess cost being borne by the consumer as an out-of-pocket expense.
The main objectives of a RP system are to increase price competition
and, ultimately, reduce public expenditure on pharmaceuticals. The ﬁrst
aim can be achieved by making patients more ”cost aware” via savings in-
centives when they ask for generic drugs. More speciﬁcally, the RP system
is equivalent to setting an avoidable copayment for those drugs whose price
is superior to the reference level. This new regulatory measure should thus
reduce the costs incurred by the third-party or Social Security.
Most of the countries which were ﬁrst to introduce the RP system have
three characteristics in common:(i) pharmaceutical prices are not directly
regulated, (ii) generic drugs account for a signiﬁcant market share and (iii)
public pharmaceutical spending accounts for more than half of total drugs
sales. Although Spain satisﬁes the third of these features, the ﬁrst two are not
accomplished. These drawbacks could explain why the Ministry of Health
repeatedly postponed the introduction of the RP system until December
2000.
In Germany, the reference price (maximum reimbursement) is taken to
be the price of the least expensive generic drug in a homogeneous group
and costs are only reimbursed up to this maximum; that is, if the retail
price exceeds the maximum reimbursement, the patient bears the excess cost.
Otherwise, the patient does not need to copay. The pharmacist is not allowed
to substitute to a generic product unless the doctor explicitly permits it on
the prescription (Pavcnik, 2002). The Swedish RP system came into eﬀect
on January 1, 1993 and speciﬁes that any cost exceeding the price of the least
expensive generic version by more than 10% must be borne by the patient
(Aronsson et al, 2001).
In Spain, the reference price is determined endogenously as a function of
the prices of both brand-name and generic versions: (i) the reference price is
deﬁned for each homogeneous group (in each homogeneous group there is at
least one generic drug), then the reference price is calculated as the weighted
average of the minimum prices until 20% of the market sales are covered;
(ii) in those cases where the diﬀerence between the reference price and the
maximum market price is less than 10%, the reference price will be set at
90% of the maximum price; (iii) if the diﬀerence between the maximum price
11and the reference price is greater than 50%, the reference price will be set at
50% of the maximum price and (iv) in all cases, the reference price can not
be lower than the minimum supplier price and it will be revised every year.
Under this new regulatory framework, the conclusions shown in the pre-
vious section about the impact of generic drug entry on pricing strategies
are not valid any more because they were obtained under the assumption of
non-price regulation.We now require a diﬀerent scenario where a new reim-
bursement mechanism is able to distort price competition. A few economists
have recently studied this phenomenon.
Aronsson et al (2001) empirically analyzed the impact of the RP system
in Sweden and found that it lowered the price of the original drug relative
to the price of the generic versions. The price-reduction eﬀect of the RP
system appears to be reasonable since the introduction of this system may
have provided strong incentives for manufacturers of brand name products
to lower their prices.
Cabrales (2003) studies oligopolistic competition in oﬀ-patent pharma-
ceutical markets using a vertical product diﬀerentiation model. His model
explains the fact that countries with stronger regulation have smaller generic
market shares. He assumes a price ceiling that corresponds to a RP system
and ﬁnds that the relative market share of the high quality good is a decreas-
ing function of the maximum price, that is, the lower the maximum price,
the higher the relative market share of the high quality product. Mestre-
Ferrándiz (2003) shows that the Spanish RP system achieves the objectives
of increasing price competition and reducing public pharmaceutical costs only
if the reference price is set within a certain interval.
Finally, Pavcnik (2002) empirically examines the link between potential
patient out-of-pocket expenses and pharmaceutical pricing using a unique
policy experiment from Germany. Using data on oral antidiabetic and an-
tiulcerant drugs, she ﬁnds that producers signiﬁcantly decrease prices after
the change in potential out-of-pocket expenses. Price declines are most pro-
nounced for brand name products. Furthermore, branded products that face
more generic competitors reduce prices to a greater extent.
Cabrales (2003) and Mestre-Ferrándiz (2003) are closer to us in the sense
that they both introduce the RP system as a market distortion. This notwith-
standing, the assumptions about product diﬀerentiation and reference price
construction diﬀer substantially. Our theoretical results are in line with re-
cent empirical ﬁndings (Aronsson et al, 2001 and Pavcnik, 2002).
123 The Model
We analyze two diﬀerent scenarios: (i) we ﬁrst solve quality and price equi-
librium before the RP system enters into force; in this case, we assume that
consumers must pay a constant copayment rate k for both types of drug and
(ii) in the second scenario, we introduce the eﬀect of the RP system. As
explained above, the RP system is a reimbursement mechanism that sets an
additional but avoidable copayment for those drugs whose price exceeds the
reference level.
We use a vertical product diﬀerentiation model with two ﬁrms operating
the market: one ﬁrm produces the brand-name drug whose patent has already
expired (B) and the other produces the corresponding generic version or
branded copy (G). We assume a two-stage game where, in the ﬁrst stage,
ﬁrms choose the ”perceived” quality of the good they want to produce and,
in the second stage, a competitive process occurs whereby ﬁrms set prices.
Although there are no administrative barriers to enter the market once
the patent on the breakthrough product has expired, both the low proﬁt
margins in the generic drug submarket and the initial lack of conﬁdence make
potential competitors reluctant to enter. Therefore, there exists a transition
period during which the market is duopolistic. Two diﬀerent scenarios can
arise; either the innovator ﬁrm decides to produce the generic version as
well applying third degree price discrimination or a third company decides
to enter the market producing the generic version. In our case, we assume
the existence of a third company.
Demand Side: Consumers have the same utility function however they
diﬀer in their tastes, which is represented by parameter v.
U(v,θi)=vθi − kpi if consumer buys one unit
U(v,θi)=0otherwise i = B,G (1)
Let consumers’ taste for drug ”perceived” quality be denoted by v and
assume a continuum of consumers indexed by their valuation v on the interval
[0,1].T h e b e n e ﬁt from purchasing one unit from producer i (B,G) is vθi
where θi is the ”perceived” quality for each producer. The perception of
quality can be either high or low. High perceived quality is associated with
the brand-name drug (θB) and low perceived quality is associated with its
generic version (θG).C o n s u m e r sw i t hah i g h e rv are more willing to pay for a
higher quality good, that is, they are relatively insensitive to price variations
and exhibit high switching costs or brand loyalty. Those consumers with a
13lower v, on the other hand, react to small changes in the relative price of the
two goods and thus exhibit low switching costs. The cost is kpi where k is
the copayment rate paid by the consumer and pi is the sale price set by the
company.6
U(v,θi) should be thought of as the surplus derived from the consumption
of the good. The utility is separable in quality and price. We assume that
consumers always have enough money to buy one unit if it is optimal to do
so and when a consumer is indiﬀerent between buying and not buying, they
buy, and when they are indiﬀerent between buying the two types of drug,
they buy the brand-name drug. In order to obtain the demand functions for
brand-name and generic drugs, we maximize the utility function as follows:
The consumer buys the brand-name drug as long as:
vθB − kpB ≥ vθG − kpG =⇒ v∗ ≥
k(pB−pG)
θB−θG and




The consumer buys the generic version if:
vθG − kpG >v θB − kpB =⇒ v∗ <
k(pB−pG)
θB−θG and




T a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a tv ∈ [0,1], the demand functions for high and











Otherwise, the consumer will not buy.
Supply Side: The competition between the two ﬁrms takes place in two
stages. In the ﬁrst stage, they decide on the quality θ to be produced with
1 > θB > 0.5 > θG > 0. There is no a priori upper bound to the level of
quality, but we assume that there exists a lower bound to it. The latter can
be interpreted as a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS) requirement (Ronnen,
1991). In our model, the MQS refers to the bioequivalence test that generic
ﬁrms should obtain before entering the market and the minimum advertising
investment needed to obtain a commercial position. On the other hand,
branded ﬁrms should engage in R&D and advertising to improve perceived
6In Spain, there is a copayment of 40% of the sale price for both the brand-name and
the generic drug. The rest is paid by the third-party.
14quality. Therefore, each ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed cost of quality improvement while






i = B,G (5)
We assume that, at each stage of the game, ﬁrms make their decisions
about quality and prices both simultaneously and sequentially. Therefore,
we obtain four diﬀerent models (Figure 1.2).
t=1 Entry Process t=2 Price Competition
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Figure 1.2. Two-stage Game: Entry Process and Price Competition
We solve the quality game taking into account two diﬀerent assumptions
about entry temporality. In the ﬁr s tm o d e l ,w ea s s u m et h a tﬁrm B (innova-
tor) registers the breakthrough drug but, due to the lack of product patent
protection, ﬁrm G can enter the market simultaneously with a copy of the
original product. This is the case of me-too drugs or branded copies.7 In the
second model, we assume that the product patent protection is accomplished
and, therefore, ﬁrm G enters the market with the generic version after the
patent on the branded drug has expired, thus implying a sequential entry.
In the second stage, ﬁrms set prices. Costs of quality development have
already been sunk and constant unit production costs are incurred. Without
loss of generality, we take these costs to be zero (Motta, 1993). We solve
7This is a consequence of an unusual patent system. For example, in Spain, under
the old patent system, only processes for the preparation of new chemical entities were
patentable. Under the new patent system, processes, and in most cases uses, have been
patentable since 1986 but products only since 1992.
15the price-setting sub-game by taking into account Bertrand and Stackelberg
price competition. It is widely accepted that price is one of the main strategic
variables in the pharmaceutical industry, however, some researchers assume
simultaneous price competition while others accept sequential price competi-
tion. For example, Zweifel and Crivelli (1996) suppose a simple duopoly
model where both, innovator and generic imitator, regard price as their
strategic variable, thus resulting in a Bertrand equilibrium. On the other
hand, several economists have studied the existence of ﬁrst-mover pricing
advantages in the pharmaceutical industry and concluded that ﬁrst movers
have brand loyalty advantages that permit them to charge higher prices and
retain substantial market shares in the future.
In summary, we solve four diﬀerent models taking into account all possible
combinations (Table 1.2). We look for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
of the game. As usual, this will be obtained by backward induction. As
stated before, we solve these four models taking into account both the ﬁxed
copayment and the RP scenario, therefore we are able to compare how ﬁrms
respond to a change from a copayment regime to a reference price system.
Model Quality Game Price Competition
Model 1 Simultaneous (branded copies) Sequential (Stackelberg)
Model 2 Sequential (generic drugs) Sequential (Stackelberg)
Model 3 Simultaneous (branded copies) Simultaneous (Bertrand)
Model 4 Sequential (generic drugs) Simultaneous (Bertrand)
Table 1.2. Simultaneous and Sequential Models
3.1 Stackelberg Model
In this section,we solve models 1&2 where the characteristic in common is
sequential price competition. Actually, we assume ﬁrst mover advantage
where the brand-name producer is the price leader (B) and generic producer
is the follower (G). The quality game is solved both simultaneously (branded
copies) and sequentially (generic drugs).
3.1.1 Price-setting Game
In the second stage, ﬁrms choose prices under the assumption that costs of




































































































8We assume that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are equal to
Q
i = piqi where qi is consumers’ demand
derived from the maximization of the utility function and pi is the sale price. Therefore,
we obtain the proﬁt function by adding together the direct revenues from the consumers
k ∗ piqi and those paid by the third-party(1 − k) ∗ piqi. This model focuses on publicly
funded pharmaceutical drugs.
9Notice that from this equation, it can be veriﬁed that v∗ >v − and v∗ >v _.
17Substituting the price equilibrium levels into the quantity equations yields












θG , shows that the brand-name price is always





θB , shows that the demand for brand-name drugs
is always higher than that for generic drugs due to ﬁrst mover advantage.
These features ﬁt the Spanish pharmaceutical market quite well.
3.1.2 Quality Game
We now look for the solutions to the quality game. We assume ﬁxed costs
of quality improvement and zero variable costs. This may be thought of as
as i t u a t i o nw h e r eﬁrms should engage in high initial R&D and advertising
activities to improve quality and strengthen market position. More speciﬁ-
cally, generics or branded copies ﬁrms (G) have to pass the bioequivalence
test to obtain permission to enter the market and they should invest in pro-
motional activities to get market reputation. On the other hand, branded
drug ﬁrms (B) should engage in R&D and advertising activities to launch
new chemical products. As would be expected, the cost of the bioequivalence
test is not comparable to the cost associated to the R&D activities necessary
to bring out a new chemical compound. The advertising and promotional
spending oriented to health professionals, both physicians and pharmacists,
is translated to consumers through supplier inducement.


















Firstly, we solve the model taking into account the simultaneous decision
regarding quality; that is, we assume the entry of an imitator ﬁrm at the
same time as the innovator company launches the new chemical compound

















4k(2θB − θG)2 − θG =0 (16)
Now, we rewrite (1.15) and (1.16) by bringing θB and θG on the right-hand
side of their respective equalities. After substituting and rearranging and














Set θG = µθB with µ 6 1 (recall that θB is the higher quality which allow




4 − 1.25 = 0 (18)
T h eo n l ys o l u t i o ni nr e a ln u m b e r sa n dl o w e rt h a no n ei sµ =0 .2319. By
substituting this value back into the ﬁrst order condition, we obtain:11
θB =0 .6358 and θG =0 .1475 (19)
and
pB =0 .6904 and pG =0 .0800 (20)
We also solve the quality game sequentially. We assume that the entry
of the generic ﬁrm occurs once the patent of the corresponding brand-name
drug has expired. In this case, the solution is more complicated and requires
the application of Newton’s interpolation with Mathematica.12 We obtain:
θB =0 .6240 and θG =0 .1471 (21)
and
pB =0 .6758 and pG =0 .0797 (22)
In both models 1&2, the second order derivatives are negative and there are
no incentives for ﬁr mGt ol e a p f r o gt h er i v a lﬁrm and produce the highest
quality itself. Therefore, we can ensure we have found Nash equilibrium.
10We use the same idea as Motta (1993), however, instead of assuming θB = µθG with
µ > 1, we do it the other way round.
11We obtain the same results with Mathematica.














In this section,we solve models 3&4 where ﬁrms compete à la Bertrand by
choosing prices simultaneously. The quality game is also solved simultane-
ously (branded copies) and sequentially (generic drugs).
3.2.1 Price-setting Game
Under Bertrand competition, we have to maximize the proﬁt functions of















































































In Bertrand models, we obtain a constant market share ratio,
qB
qG =2 ,s ot h a t
the penetration of the branded product always doubles that of the generic
drugs.
203.2.2 Quality Game


















Firstly, we solve the model taking into account the simultaneous decision
regarding quality, that is, we assume the entry of an imitator ﬁrm at the
same time as the innovator company launches the new chemical compound


















k(4θB − θG)2 +
2θBθG(θB − θG)
k(4θB − θG)3 − θG =0 (31)
Now, we rewrite (1.30) and (1.31) by bringing θB and θG on the right-hand
side of their respective equalities. After substituting and rearranging and
















Set θG = µθB with µ 6 1 (recall that θB is the higher quality which allow
us to perform this transformation), so that we can rewrite (1.32) as:
25µ
3 − 40µ
2 +6 2 .5µ − 10 = 0 (33)
T h eo n l ys o l u t i o ni nr e a ln u m b e r sa n dl o w e rt h a no n ei sµ =0 .1780.By
substituting this value back into the ﬁrst order condition, we obtain:13
θB =0 .6332 and θG =0 .1205 (34)
and
pB =0 .6729 and pG =0 .0640 (35)
We also solve the quality game sequentially. We assume that the entry
of the generic ﬁrm occurs once the patent of the corresponding brand-name
13We obtain the same results with Mathematica.
21drug has expired. In this case, the solution is more complicated and requires
the application of Newton’s interpolation with Mathematica.14 We obtain:
θB =0 .6129 and θG =0 .1195 (36)
and
pB =0 .6484 and pG =0 .0632 (37)
In both models 3&4, the second order derivatives are negative and there are
no incentives for ﬁr mGt ol e a p f r o gt h er i v a lﬁrm and produce the highest
quality itself. Therefore, we can ensure we have found Nash equilibrium.
By way of a summary, Table 1.3 below shows a comparison of the results:





Model 1 0.6357 0.1474 0.4883 0.6904 0.0800 0.6104 58% 42%
Model 2 0.6240 0.1471 0.4769 0.6758 0.0797 0.5961 59% 41%
Model 3 0.6332 0.1205 0.5127 0.6729 0.0640 0.6089 67% 33%
Model 4 0.6129 0.1195 0.4934 0.6484 0.0632 0.5851 67% 33%
Table 1.3: Results Comparison
Generally speaking, when ﬁrms compete à la Bertrand (model 3&4), the
degree of quality diﬀerentiation is larger than in Stackelberg models (model
1&2) and, paradoxically, ﬁrms also compete more aggressively in terms of
prices. In Stackelberg models, new entrants (G) choose both quality and
prices in order to be positioned closer to established ﬁrms (Figure 1.3).













22Figure 1.3. Quality and Price Diﬀerentiation
Models 1&3 solve the quality game simultaneously, thus assuming the
entrance of branded copies, while models 2&4 solve the quality game sequen-
tially taking into account the entry of generic drugs. The degree of diﬀer-
entiation is always higher in branded copy scenarios than in generic drug
scenarios. This is not always satisﬁed in pharmaceutical markets where imi-
tator laboratories try to make themselves easily confused with original ones.
Market shares are more extreme in Bertrand models -67% branded drugs and
33% generic drugs- than in Stackelberg models -52% branded drugs and 48%
generic drugs. In Bertrand models, market share distribution remains con-
stant because branded producers decrease prices in order to maintain market
penetration.
4 The Reference Price System
It is clear from Royal Decree 1035/1999 that the reference price for each
homogeneous group is determined endogenously using the previous-year drug
prices. For simplicity, we work in one shot period and assume that the
reference price is a linear function of both branded and generic drug prices;
more speciﬁcally, it takes the following form where α and β are exogenous
23weights that represent respective market shares:
pR = αpG + βpB (38)
This is a general expression and, therefore, it can be adapted to other RP
system variations, for example, assuming α =0and β =1 ,(pR = pB), α =1
and β =0( pR = pG) or a ﬁx e dp r o p o r t i o no fb o t h .
We also assume that α >kwhich ensures that the reference price will be
never lower than the generic price. This is the reason why we can consider
an additional but avoidable copayment for the branded product but no ad-
ditional copayment for the generic drug. Therefore, the RP system modiﬁes
the demand function for both branded and generic drugs as follows.
The consumer buys the brand-name drug as long as:
vθB − kpB − (pB − αpG − βpB) ≥ vθG − kpG =⇒ v∗ ≥
(k+1−β)pB−(k+α)pG
(θB−θG) and




The consumer buys the generic drug if:
vθG − kpG >v θB − kpB − (pB − αpG − βpB)= ⇒ v∗ <
(k+1−β)pB−(k+α)pG
(θB−θG) and




Substituting and rearranging, we obtain the new demand functions:
qB =1 −
(k +1− β)pB − (k + α)pG
(θB − θG)
and qG =






Changes in patient out-of-pocket expenses aﬀect the prevailing demand con-
ditions in the market and might alter the markup that pharmaceutical ﬁrms
charge over marginal cost (Pavcnik, 2002). According to our model, price
competition is now distorted due to the implementation of a new regulatory
framework. At this stage, the quality game is over and ﬁxed quality costs are
already sunk, therefore, ﬁrms can only react through price movements. We
solve the price-setting subgame again taking into account the new demand
functions.
Using the same procedure as before, we obtain the following price equi-
librium for Stackelberg and Bertrand respectively:
pB =
(θB − θG)(kθB + αθG)
(k +1− β)[(α − k)θG +2 kθB)]
and pG =
θG(θB − θG)
2[(α − k)θG +2 kθB)]
(42)
24pB =
2(θB − θG)(kθB + αθG)
(k +1− β)[4(αθG + kθB) − θG(k + α)]
and pG =
θG(θB − θG)
4(αθG + kθB) − θG(k + α)
(43)
A c c o r d i n gt ot h ea s s u m p t i o n sa b o u tα and β, we could have a great number
of scenarios for each model. In Table 1.4, we just consider two diﬀerent
scenarios: one in which α and β take the market share values that existed
before the introduction of the RP system (Table 1.3), and another in which an
ideal situation where branded and generic drugs share the market is assumed
(α = β =0 .5).





Model 1 0.6357 0.1474 0.4883 0.42 0.58 0.3681 0.0704 0.2430 62% 38%
Model 1 0.6357 0.1474 0.4883 0.50 0.50 0.3400 0.0688 0.2044 61% 39%
Model 2 0.6240 0.1471 0.4769 0.41 0.59 0.3644 0.0701 0.2437 62% 38%
Model 2 0.6240 0.1471 0.4769 0.50 0.50 0.3332 0.0683 0.2007 61% 39%
Model 3 0.6332 0.1205 0.5127 0.33 0.67 0.3797 0.0570 0.2732 67% 33%
Model 3 0.6332 0.1205 0.5127 0.50 0.50 0.3118 0.0539 0.1829 67% 33%
Model 4 0.6129 0.1195 0.4934 0.33 0.67 0.3660 0.0561 0.2637 67% 33%
Model 4 0.6129 0.1195 0.4934 0.50 0.50 0.3006 0.0531 0.1768 67% 33%
Table 1.4: Comparison of Results with Reference Price
Doing comparative statics and using the scenario α = β =0 .5 as a
benchmark , we can gain some insights into how ﬁrms react when parameters
of the model change. In our model, the higher the weight of the generic drug
(α), the lower the weight of the branded drug (β) and, therefore, the lower
the reference price (remember that pB >p G); as a consequence, both branded
and generic ﬁrms decrease prices (
∂pB
∂α < 0 and
∂pG
∂α < 0). On the other hand,
the higher the weight of branded drug, the higher the reference price and, as
a consequence, both branded and generic ﬁrms increase prices (
∂pB









Before 0.6904 0.0800 58% 42%
After 0.3681 0.0704 62% 38%
Model 2
Before 0.6758 0.0797 59% 41%
After 0.3644 0.0701 62% 38%
Model 3
Before 0.6729 0.0640 67% 33%
After 0.3797 0.0570 67% 33%
Model 4
Before 0.6484 0.0632 67% 33%
After 0.3660 0,0561 67% 33%
T a b l e1 . 5 .B e f o r ea n dA f t e rR PS y s t e m
Under the RP system, branded producers decrease prices substantially
in order to adapt to the new competitive situation while generic prices re-
main more or less constant. In Bertrand models (3&4), market shares do
not change after the introduction of reference prices while in Stackelberg
models (model 1&2), the market share of branded drugs even increases and
that of generic drugs decreases. In both cases, the brand-name producers
compensate for the decline of proﬁts by selling greater quantities rather than
charging higher prices (Table 1.5).
Contrasting our theoretical results with recent empirical ﬁndings, we re-
alize that our conclusions are in the same line. Pavcnik (2002) found that
producers signiﬁcantly decrease prices after the change in patient out-of-
pocket expenses and, furthermore, these price declines are most pronounced
for brand-name products.
5 Social Welfare Analysis: Ramsey Prices
Comparing the relative price ratio prevailing before and after the introduction
of the RP system, it is clear that price competition has increased. In this
sense, government has achieved one of the main objectives that this new








26Unfortunately, actual regulation often deviates considerably from an optimal
regulation that aims to limit market ineﬃciencies and maximize social wel-
fare. The problem of how to set prices so as to maximize social welfare whilst
ensuring that all costs are covered can arise in many contexts. Ramsey prices
are designed to address the situation where it is necessary to increase prices
above the level of marginal cost. More speciﬁcally, the standard Ramsey
pricing rule says that ”in order to maximize social welfare, prices in diﬀerent
market segments should be set such that the mark-up over marginal cost in
each segment is inversely proportional to the price sensitivity of demand”.
Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumer and producer surplus
and proﬁts are equal to the sum of revenues in each demand segment less the
cost (without loss of generality, we assume variable costs to be zero, however,
















and the proﬁt functions are:















Although there are two diﬀerent ﬁrms in the market, the innovator and the
generic imitator, we add their proﬁts together as if only one ﬁrm produced
















We maximize consumer surplus subject to the constraint that proﬁts must
achieve at least a pre-speciﬁed minimum proﬁtl e v e lΠ :
Max
pB,pG



























We solve the maximization problem using Kuhn-Tucker theorem and set up
the Lagrangian:





























where λ is the Lagrange multiplier that measures the value, in terms of social
welfare, of relaxing the proﬁtc o n s t r a i n tb yas m a l la m o u n t .
We take derivatives with respect to prices and ﬁnally get:
pBRamsey =
θB(λ − k − kv)
2kλ − 2k2 and pGRamsey =
θG(λ − k − kv)
2kλ − 2k2 (50)
Now, we proceed to compare the degree of price competition under two dif-
ferent regulatory framework: the RP system and Ramsey pricing. We thus





















)Ramsey =⇒ 2θG + θB(k − 1+β) > 0 (52)
and competition will be stronger under the RP system when the above ex-
pression becomes negative. Table 1.6 shows that Ramsey pricing should be
the optimal regulatory system as long as the penetration of generic drugs is
not very high while the RP system should become the most eﬃcient price
control mechanism once the generic market share has reached a signiﬁcant
percentage. Under Stackelberg price competition (models 1&2), the RP sys-
tem will be the most eﬃcient form of regulation as long as generic drug
market share exceeds 80% (α =0 .8) while this threshold decreases to 70%
under Bertrand price competition models.16
15The relative price ratio under Bertrand and Stackelberg models coincide.
16”The share of generic drugs must increase if we want the reference price system to
work properly”, Gaceta de los Negocios, November 1998.
28αβ Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
0 1 ++++
0 . 1 0 . 9 ++++
0 . 2 0 . 8 ++++
0 . 3 0 . 7 ++++
0 . 4 0 . 6 ++++
0 . 5 0 . 5 ++++
0 . 6 0 . 4 ++++
0.7 0.3 + + - -
0 . 8 0 . 2 ----
0 . 9 0 . 1 ----
1 0 ----
Table 1.6. Optimal Price Regulation
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper analyzes the impact of the RP system on the price-setting strate-
gies of pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Several European countries have already es-
tablished this new reimbursement mechanism as a regulatory measure aimed
at containing national pharmaceutical spending through the promotion of
price competition and the increased usage of generic drugs. Although there
are several variations in the RP calculation method, we employ a general
expression that could be adapted to all European versions; therefore, our
conclusions could be extrapolated to other countries with a similar regula-
tory framework.
U s i n gav e r t i c a lp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation model, we compare a copayment
regime under which consumers must pay a ﬁxed out-of-pocket expense with
the new RP system which entails an additional but avoidable copayment for
those drugs whose price exceeds the reference level.
The mentioned changes in the copayment regime aﬀect the prevailing
demand conditions and might alter the markup that pharmaceutical ﬁrms
charge over marginal cost. At this point, the quality game is over and ﬁxed
quality costs are already sunk, therefore, ﬁrms can only react through price
movements.
We ﬁnd that, under the RP system, branded producers decrease prices
substantially in order to adapt to the new competitive situation while generic
prices remain more or less constant. In Bertrand models, market shares do
29not change after the introduction of reference prices while in Stackelberg
models, the market share of branded drugs even increases and that of generic
drugs decreases. In both cases, the brand-name producers compensate for
t h ed e c l i n eo fp r o ﬁts by selling greater quantities rather than charging higher
prices. Contrasting our theoretical results with recent empirical ﬁndings, we
realize that our conclusions are in the same line. Econometric studies found
that producers signiﬁcantly decrease prices after the change in patient out-of-
pocket expenses and, furthermore, these price decreases are most pronounced
for brand-name products.
We also carry out a social welfare analysis and compare price competition
under RP system and Ramsey pricing. We ﬁnd that the reference price
system maximizes price competition when the penetration of generic drugs
exceeds 70% of the market; otherwise, Ramsey prices can better ensure price
competition and maximization of social welfare.
Finally, we can conclude that, from a theoretical point of view, the RP
system achieves the objective of increasing price competition, however, we
are not in a position to say anything about the impact on the public phar-
maceutical spending, as it is beyond the scope of this paper. An interesting
observation is the fact that, although the social planner succeeds in promot-
ing price competition between branded and generic drugs, it completely fails
in raising generic drug usage among the population. Actually, both the im-
plementation of the RP system and the potential entrance of generic drugs
constitute a suﬃciently credible threat for branded producers to decrease
prices. Therefore, it is not necessary to count on an eﬀective large generic
drug market share for price competition to increase. In this sense, generic
ﬁrms in Spain and other countries with similar regulatory frameworks could
feel disappointed with a regulatory measure that do not de facto promote
the use of lower-cost generic drugs.
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